Winning the War on Terror

There is this idea--this justification--that after 9/11, everything changes. That is, with regard to the War in Afghanistan, the War in Iraq, and the greater global War on Terror and its efforts at home, the events of September 11, 2001 must effectively restructure our way of life. And furthermore that the ways in which we have previously understood rights and both justice of war and justice in war are now subject to new rules and a radically different conception of what is and is not permissible. For the Bush administration this has meant justified expansion of the use of security forces and the armed services both at home and abroad; for Benjamin Netanyahu it means curtailing some civil liberties and basic rights to assume “an active posture against terror”; for Howard Zinn it means retooling America’s foreign policy to end the military superpower status and reinvent ourselves as the global humanitarian superpower.

Still for others it may be a nonsensical idea in a time when, after 9/11, everything ought to stay the same, with respect to the inalienable rights that lie at the foundation of the Constitution, and out of respect for the fact that, while quite large in scale and totally unjust, terrorism should not be seen as a new threat or as suddenly a more worthy foe now that America has been attacked. In other words, terrorism has long been a tool of fanatics, well known to the US government, and has cost many thousands of lives elsewhere, and should be addressed as such, if there is to be a “war on terror”. Asserting that everything now changes has been perhaps so easy for America to do in part because of what the world granted immediately after the attack in terms of sympathy for the American people and authority in bringing justice to the attackers. That the hijacking of planes was inexcusable was proclaimed virtually across the international board, and in some ways may have led to the posture of the US that it had free reign over the war and was justified on a unlimited basis because of the grotesqueness of the attack. However, once the war began, and the effort extended to the entire notion of terrorism instead of a more narrowly defined goal of only justice against the perpetrators the obvious inconsistency arose whereby the United States had to define terrorism in ways that exempted its own actions that could have fallen under most definitions of terrorism.

Eqbal Ahmad, in an address given in October, 1998 at the University of Colorado at Boulder, pointed out at length this fact that terrorism has not been adequately or officially defined by the United States. He outlined what he called the “official approach” to terrorism, and one of those points is the fact that “the official approach to terrorism is a posture of inconsistency”. Terrorism is approached not intellectually, he contends, but emotionally, where “officials don’t define terrorism because definitions involve a commitment to analysis, comprehension, and adherence to some norms of consistency”. The reasons for this are obvious enough, as public support for military response and might are not aroused by intelligent discourse but by emotional outrage. Not to mention that since the US has at times supported terrorists in Central America and the Middle East against governments, it becomes clear that a strict definition of terrorism would not serve well in a war that is supposed to be about the very eradication of the thing itself.

The other reason for the US avoidance of specific definitions of terrorism is that terrorists change. And not the terrorists, really, at least not always. More specifically, their respective strategic positions with respect to the United States is what is known to change. Where the Zionists in Gaza were terrorists, they became freedom fighters, and where Osama bin Laden was a US ally and became its foremost enemy. This inconsistency is facilitated by the whimsical and shifting notion of what makes a terrorist a terrorist. Indeed, the US has supported any number of objectively terrorist regimes in the name of the lesser of two evils or national self interest all over the world, as Ahmad explains in great detail.

What Ahmad aims at is the idea that if terrorism is to be confronted or defeated it must be understood, not simply hated. His position is that terrorism absolutely has causes, and that the US has historically ignored causes or justifications of any sort and instead shouted down the very idea to say that terrorism is blind, without cause or reason, that terrorists do not have a legitimate position and that the only goal of terrorism is barbarism. Ahmad certainly does not seek to justify terrorism as a legitimate means of communication or resistance, but it is still the case that understanding the motives of the terrorists must be understood if war is to be won against the very option of terror itself. Certainly there is an element of Islamic fundamentalist terror that can be understood as hatred of the West, but to dismiss every action and idea as causeless is to exacerbate the hatred such groups would have for America. The official response to terrorism that Ahmad discussed was given before the September 11 attacks, and deals largely with the historic approach taken by the US government toward terrorism. The fact that it was delivered before the attacks means, of course, that it does not speak to the notion that now everything changes, but perhaps addresses the fact that there remains an overarching issue long ignored and now realized that terrorism as a tool must never be acceptable.

But given that the terrorist attack on 9/11 happened, and with such incredible means and results, a new discussion has begun to take place. While of course ignoring other examples of terrorism, the discussion has been scaled down to specifically Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. What Benjamin Netanyahu has called for is “an active posture against terror” by the United States. What this means, among other things, is that the U.S. ought to seek out terrorists with increased security measures, increased interrogation, limited freedoms for its citizens, and a different set of ideals--one that emphasizes the responsibility to confront terror by means of “overwhelming technological and logistical advantages” over and above any imagined absoluteness of rights and liberties. It means government intelligence watching for terrorist activity day and night, monitoring fringe groups and “employing preemptive surveillance, search and seizure, interrogations, detentions, and prosecutions” whereupon there is evidence of terrorist activity.

This position has been taken by a great number of those on the political right, as well as the Bush administration with the likes of the U.S.A. Patriot Act which, although complicated, allows for many such measures to be employed at the discretion of the government and its information-gathering agencies. It seems like a common sense position at times, and in some respects is--curbing our security forces unnecessarily would certainly be inadmissible. But what seems striking is that the same people who generally do not support government intervention into things like the markets because of the government’s patent inefficiency and bureaucratic, cumbersome nature suddenly give full faith and credit to the same government as if those issues will cease to be. That somehow the government will be effective and precise in this department--and in it alone--is obviously flawed. This becomes even more so when the intelligence is part of Homeland Security, which is often just local authorities without proper training and the wholesale firestorm against any idea which seems to be out-of-bounds, whether it is a terrorist group or not. Simply pointing to behaviors in which terrorists might engage (even pamphleteering or indoctrination) does not expose terrorists necessarily.

Netanyahu properly points out that we have never had absolute free speech, and may have some reasonable restrictions placed upon it. For him, this extends to any number of other rights, and their being stunted by the government in the fight against terrorism is necessary. He claims that to not limit these freedoms and risk not defeating terrorism is to also deny basic human rights; those that are under attack when terrorism strikes. So it becomes in this sense a trade-off. Either rights are monitored during security concerns or terrorists may have an easier path to terror, which will also limit freedom. This argument is not without merit, but seems problematic for the very reason that those who have access to security and intelligence will inform the public about what the dangers are, and the public will be forced to believe the government, handing in its claims on rights, therefore leaning squarely on the government for what they previously held claim to not because the government granted it to them, but because God did. Those rights that the Constitution exclaimed could never be taken away are now doled out by the government only when it is safe to do so, effectively silencing the public during times of war. Duty and subordination are simply sold to the public because of a terrifying and eminent threat--emotion over intellect--and limited social institutions like religion and the press will have a difficult time holding accountable those at the top.

Netanyahu believes that anti-terror measures and limited rights for a time are successful ways to combat the evil of terrorism, and he points out the various countries around the world who have done so. Britain, Germany, Italy and France, he says, have all established anti-terror guidelines and systems that many would see as a denial of civil liberties. They all had a moment of clarity that forced their hands, so to speak, and although this particular argument was made prior to 9/11, Netanyahu would presumably conclude that we should now have reached America’s moment; that after 9/11, everything changes.

Professor Howard Zinn has proposed a vastly different approach to the whole notion of fighting terrorism. Writing early on in the War in Afghanistan, and even before the War in Iraq or the greater War on Terrorism, he saw in the fight a just cause, but a patently unjust war. Our techniques and methods of bombing cities was tantamount to terrorism itself, killing innocent civilians and displacing entire cities at a time. Without entering the messy business of what justice in war truly means, it is sufficient to note that the U.S. has, at times, engaged in the killing of civilians that, even if necessary or unavoidable for some cause or another would be regarded as a terrorist activity by many around the world. Zinn’s conclusion is that our military presence and tactics have incited much of the anger toward us, and a committed policy of humanitarianism over militarism would quell many of the angers and hostilities of the world. We stop fighting evil, perhaps, with the goal of removing some of its fuel and take an absolute stance on the moral high ground in not engaging the terrorist.

Both strategies seem to fly in the face of what America’s foreign and domestic policies have hoped to achieve. We have typically fought evil abroad (if reluctantly), and protected rights at home (except, of course, for Japanese Americans in WWII and other isolated but unacceptable moments of thievery of rights). And while both seem to distinguish themselves from the norm in unsavory ways, they both also hold an appeal to most people. Many have granted the government the power to do what needs to be done and given away certain freedoms. Many others are sympathetic to the idea that we could use defense spending on humanitarian aid and more positively affect the world. That this would do anything to stop the hatred of terrorist organizations though is, of course, debatable. One strategy has the proven techniques of anti-terrorist campaigns in its corner, the other the high-flown hopes of changing the terrorist mindset and removing American forces from areas which could be perhaps better served food than bombs.

Richard Falk wrote just days after the 9/11 attack that the military would need to exercise restraint and diligence in defeating terrorism because its nature means that it is “a war without military solutions... a war in which the pursuit of the traditional military goal of ‘victory’ is almost certain to intensify the challenge and spread the violence.” Falk is identifying the same type of issue as Ahmad in the need for America to seriously entertain the notion of causation in terrorist threats and attacks. He also lobbied for the type of multilateralism that would embrace sympathy from the world instead of the type of unilateralism that would undoubtedly turn the tide of support to anger and resentment. What happened is what Falk feared, a sort of military overreaction.

In addition to multilateralism and United Nations Security Council authorization, Falk argues that “if retaliatory action fails to abide by [international law and the just war tradition]...then it will be seen by most as replicating the fundamental evil of terrorism...as violence directed against those who are innocent and against civilian society.” This is of course a similar argument to the one made earlier by Howard Zinn, that our just cause becomes an unjust war when it displaces and disregards communities and makes casualties of innocent civilians. Even the most staunch of those against the UN and against the need of a world community for self defense should find attractive the notion that America would continue to uphold those things it aims to stand for, that make it worth defending in the first place. World support both militarily and monetarily would likely stem from America upholding the sanctity of innocent life and justice in war. Certainly the Bush Administration called upon the world for support against the terrorist regimes, and Falk further suggests that “a struggle against global terrorism even in its narrowest sense would require the most intense forms of intergovernmental cooperation ever experienced in the history of international relations.” Reducing the sole burden from America of defender of Western values like secularism and pluralism, freedom and democracy would be advisable and welcomed, but would require a different approach with regard to how Washington viewed the world beforehand.

Winning the War on Terrorism has become so vague and complicated a notion that its justification for continuance is as shady as ever. Winning the war might mean becoming less militarized and more humanitarian; it may mean limiting freedoms for a time to militarily strike the ability of terrorist cells to operate. Or it may, on the other hand, mean entirely reconfiguring the way the US views terrorism. It might mean that we no longer respond unilaterally to terrorism and that we consider it something to be understood, not as a viable means but as the reaction to something in the world, valid or otherwise. It might mean the assured destruction of all known terrorist camps and supporters, but that meaning would perpetually struggle with the simple fact that ideas do not often die with people, and the underlying contempt would almost certainly persist.

That terrorism is unacceptable has been well established by all reasonable parties in the discourse on justice and war. Without a doubt, the United States was justified in wanting justice and action against its attackers. But not all agree on what exactly should be the appropriate path toward such justice, and now, seven years after the attack the notion that after 9/11, everything changes may be at the end of its road. Although clearly an attack so large means that some things will change. The world has seen terrorism, however loosely and incoherently defined, brought to the forefront of international discourse. Although, for many in the world it was already the case, now America has simply tuned in. Decent people all over the world have hated terrorism and terrorist organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere for many years, but now that America has acted militarily is ways so similar to them they may have invited the same reaction to its shores as against the terrorists themselves.

Richard Falk succinctly summarized that the US could not itself seem to be a terrorist group, or in any way appear to fall in line with state terrorism, while at the same time condemning the terrorist organizations. “Such a double standard,” he wrote, “will damage the indispensable effort to draw a credible distinction between the criminality of the attack and the legitimacy of the retaliation.” We have seen this to be the case, and we shall continue to so long as the flag is permitted to fly that says, after 9/11, everything changes.

The proper response may take parts from all those previously mentioned--curtailed rights, humanitarianism, an understanding of terrorism--but they must all be subordinate to the very idea that, regardless of what is done to the United States--if it is what we have always said it is--that some things ought to change and some things ought not to. There must be a change in the US understanding of the need for world support and there must be some definitions on what winning the war really means. But there must not be a change with respect to how the US approaches justice and there must not be a change in the manner in which its citizens are dealt with. Overbearing security measures and a redefining of freedom in the name of defeating an unknown enemy will never be the means by which a war should be fought or won. To say that now things must change because of the magnitude of that terrible day is to bring into question what the principles this country rests upon are really worth, and to defiantly supersede what the world already knows in terms of terrorism and war. It is possible and desirable that the United States should cling to its vociferously proclaimed standards and ideals and resist the urge to militarily dominate this enemy, thereby winning the war for any and all who hope to continually celebrate upon those lofty and hard-fought mountaintops of liberty and justice for all.

(written in December, 2008)

See also:

Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism. “The Question of Civil Liberties" 1995. Pgs. 27-50.

Howard Zinn, "A Just Cause, Not a Just War" December, 2001, The Progressive.

Eqbal Ahmad, Terrorism: Theirs and Ours. Seven Stories Press, New York, 2001.